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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – DEATH PENALTY 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court considers an appeal of a death penalty sentence for a first-degree 
murder conviction. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
  The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and held that no error existed that 
would warrant a new trial.  Under Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f), the district court had good cause 
to allow a late filing of a notice of evidence in aggravation.  The danger of prejudice to 
the defense in its preparation was a relevant factor in the good cause determination for 
untimely notice.  Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156 (2007) did not preclude admission of 
presentence investigation reports at penalty hearings.   
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 On September 22, 2006, Eugene Nunnery (“Nunnery”) and three other men, all 
armed with guns, approached five men in an apartment complex parking lot and 
demanded money.  After one of the other men began to run, Nunnery shot one victim in 
the head at close range and another in the back of the head as he was fleeing.  Nunnery’s 
companions also unsuccessfully shot at the other victims.  The victim that Nunnery shot 
in the head at close range was the only fatality. 
 Nunnery was charged with open murder, two counts of attempted murder, 
conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, and two counts of attempted robbery.  The State 
sought the death penalty, and tried Nunnery and his codefendants separately.  The jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.  The district court bifurcated the penalty 
hearing.  
 In the first phase, the parties presented mitigating and aggravating evidence for 
the jury to weigh.  Although the State is required to file a notice of evidence in 
aggravation at least fifteen days before the trial begins under Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f), the 
district court accepted the State’s filing twelve days before the trial began.  The district 
court found good cause existed for the untimely notice because Nunnery’s case was 
supposed to be the last tried of the three cases against Nunnery and his codefendants.  
The district court also found a lack of prejudice to the defense to prepare to confront the 
evidence summarized in the notice because the State filed similar notices in the other two 
cases and the attorneys for all three cases were the same.  The jury concluded that the 
mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances.  
 In the second phase, the state presented Nunnery’s criminal history and a victim-
impact statement while Nunnery presented sociological and penological evidence.  The 
jury sentenced Nunnery to death for the first-degree murder conviction.  The district court 
sentenced Nunnery for the other charges in a separate hearing. 
                                                        
1
  By Sabrina Dolson. 
 Nunnery alleged several claims arising out of the penalty hearing. Nunnery first 
challenged the district court’s finding that the State had good cause for filing a late notice 
of evidence in aggravation and that he was not prejudiced.  Nunnery alternatively claimed 
that lack of prejudice is not relevant to the district court’s determination of good cause.   
Furthermore, Nunnery challenged the admission of presentence investigation reports at 
the penalty hearing and the instruction to the jury concerning mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances.  Nunnery also made several guilt-phase hearing claims. 
 
Discussion 
 
Penalty Phase Claims 
 
Notice of Evidence in Aggravation under SCR 250(4)(f) 
 
 Justice Cherry wrote for the unanimous Court, sitting en banc.  The Court begain 
its analysis by examining the notice requirements under Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f).  Under this 
statute, the State must file a notice of evidence in aggravation, which includes a summary 
of the evidence the State plans to present, at least fifteen days before the penalty phase of 
trial is to begin in cases where the State seeks the death penalty.  The court must not 
allow introduction of evidence not included in the notice unless the State can show good 
cause and the defense is permitted a continuance to prepare to confront the evidence.
2
  
The Court concluded that although Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f) only addresses the late 
introduction of evidence not summarized in the notice, it must similarly allow the late 
filing of a notice of evidence in aggravation in order to avoid discouraging the State from 
filing a late or amended notice.  
 To determine “good cause” under Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f), the Court found factors 
used in previous decisions regarding pretrial notice statutes persuasive.  The Court 
recognized that “good cause” is a relative term and “its meaning must be determined not 
only by the verbal context of the statute in which the term is employed, but also by the 
context of the action and procedures involved and the type of case presented.”3  The 
Court declined to apply the definition of “good cause” used in Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(d)4 
because although “good cause” appears in both Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(d) and (f), the policies 
and purposes of the provisions differ and thus warrant different definitions of “good 
cause.”  The Court concluded that Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f) warrants the use of a broad 
definition of “good cause” that allows courts to consider multiple factors. 
 The purpose of Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f) is to provide the defendant with sufficient 
notice to prepare to confront evidence while taking into account reasons for the delay.  
When deciding whether “good cause” exists for a late notice filing, a court should 
therefore consider any relevant factors, such as “(1) the reason for the delay, including 
whether it was within the State’s control, (2) whether the State acted in good faith, (3) the 
length of the delay, and (4) the danger of prejudice to the defendant,” that are consistent 
with the purpose of Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f).  The absence of prejudice alone is insufficient 
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  SUP. CT. R. 250(4)(f). 
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  Wray v. Folsom, 166 F. Supp. 390, 394 (W.D. Ark. 1958). 
4
  When notice is not served, “[g]ood cause requires a reason external to the prosecutor” (quoting State v. 
Dist. Ct. (Marshall), 116 Nev. 953, 968, 11 P.3d 1209, 1218 (2000)).  
to show “good cause” for filing a late notice.  The Court determined prejudice by 
considering the impact the evidence in aggravation had on the defendant’s preparation for 
confronting that evidence, not the impact the evidence had on the jury’s penalty verdict. 
 The Court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, which is satisfied only if the 
district court acted “arbitrar[il]y or capricious[ly] or if it exceed[ed] the bounds of law or 
reason.”5  The district court found good cause for filing a late notice of evidence of 
aggravation because the delay in filing was not significant, the State did not act in bad 
faith, the delay was only three days, there was sufficient opportunity for Nunnery to 
object to the admissibility of the evidence and for the court to address that objection, and 
no prejudice to the defense resulted from the late filing.  The Court concluded that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion after considering these relevant factors. 
 
Presentence Investigation Reports 
 
 In response to Nunnery’s challenge to the admissibility of presentence 
investigation (PSI) reports at the penalty hearing, the Court concluded that PSI reports are 
admissible at penalty hearings pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156(2).  Nunnery relied on 
Herman v. State,
6
 in which the defendant was granted a new penalty hearing after the 
State read uncharged crimes, some of which were irrelevant to the crime charged, from a 
PSI report.  The Court renounced Herman’s interpretation that admission of uncharged 
crimes in a PSI report is a violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156(5) because Nev. Rev. Stat. 
176.156(2) states that law enforcement agencies may use PSI reports without limitation 
in public hearings.  The Court concluded that disclosures permitted by Nev. Rev. Stat. 
176.156(2) are not precluded by the rule that PSI reports are not to be part of the public 
record under Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156(5). 
 The Court further renounced Herman’s conclusion that evidence of prior crimes is 
inadmissible if irrelevant to the crime charged at the penalty hearing.  The Court 
concluded that evidence of uncharged crimes in PSI reports is admissible as “other 
matter” evidence regardless if the evidence supports the defendant’s guilt.  The Court 
stated that “other matter” evidence is relevant because it allows the jury to determine its 
sentence after considering the defendant’s “character, record, and the circumstances of 
the offense.”7  This type of evidence can also be excluded if it is “impalpable or highly 
suspect.”8  The broad grant of power to the trial judge to determine which evidence 
should be admitted at the penalty hearing under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.552 supports this 
conclusion.  
 The Court concluded that because Nunnery did not object to any of the 
information in the PSI report that was revealed to the jury at the penalty hearing, he 
would have to show plain error to receive relief.  The Court found that Nunnery did not 
show any error because the PSI report preparer testified and was available for cross-
examination, and arrests that did not lead to convictions were redacted from the PSI 
report. 
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Weighing Instruction 
 
 Nunnery challenged the district court’s refusal to issue a jury instruction that 
would require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  The Court found that the district 
court did not err in refusing to give the jury instruction. 
 Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.554(2)-(3), the jury must weigh mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances when the State pursues the death penalty.  However, dicta in 
Johnson v. State
9
 directly conflicted with the holding in McConnell v. State.
10
  Johnson 
indicated that the jury’s weighing determination of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in a capital case must be held to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
11
  
However, McConnell held that the State may impose the death penalty without the jury 
finding or the State proving that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court reaffirmed McConnell and reversed 
Johnson to the extent it conflicted with the Court’s holding that the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard is not applicable because weighing mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances is not a factual determination. 
 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is only applicable to the jury’s 
determination that an aggravating circumstance exists, not to the weighing of aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances.
12
  Once the jury finds that at least one aggravating 
circumstance exists, it must then determine whether there are sufficient mitigating 
circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstance(s).
13
  In Johnson, the court 
found that the determination of whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist and 
outweigh the aggravating circumstances is in part a factual determination and thus subject 
to the Sixth Amendment.
14
  The Court held that the statement in Johnson was “correct to 
the extent that it refer[red] to the finding of mitigating circumstances,” not the weighing 
of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.  
  The Court also found that Nevada’s statutory scheme did not support the 
conclusion that the weighing determination involves a factual determination, but rather 
that the weighing determination is a purely judgmental process.  The Court concluded 
that the Nevada Legislature’s decision not to identify a burden of proof for the weighing 
determination or require the Court to consider the sufficiency of evidence with respect to 
the weighing determination in review of a death sentence supported its holding.
15
  Out of 
the three statutory provisions that address the weighing determination,
16
 only one uses the 
word “finds” when referring to the weighing determination.17  
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 The Court further stated that the definition of “fact” supported its holding.  The 
Court defined a “fact” as “[a] thing done; an action performed or an incident transpiring; 
an event or circumstance,”18 and concluded that the weighing determination requires a 
balancing of facts to reach a conclusion, not a finding of any facts. 
 Lastly, the Court held the district court did not err in refusing Nunnery’s 
requested jury instruction because it stated the incorrect standard.  Nunnery requested a 
jury instruction that would require the jury to find that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances before giving the death penalty.  However, 
under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.554(3), (4), the death penalty is contingent on the jury finding 
sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.  
 
The Great-Risk-of-Death-to-More-Than-One-Person Aggravator 
 
 Nunnery challenged the district court’s decision permitting the State to seek the 
“great risk of death to more than one person” aggravator on four grounds.  The Court 
held that the district court did not err on any of these grounds.  
 Nunnery first argued that the State did not provide timely notice of the aggravator 
because the notice of evidence in aggravation was filed three days late and the evidence 
used to support this aggravator was unique to this case.  The Court held that the late 
notice of evidence did not prejudice Nunnery because the notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty, filed a year before trial, informed Nunnery of the evidentiary basis for the 
great-risk-of-death aggravator.  Furthermore, this evidence was presented at the guilt 
phase of trial. 
 Second, Nunnery argued that the State changed its theory for the aggravator in the 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty to an accomplice theory in the notice of 
evidence because the State referred to Nunnery “and his codefendants” in the latter and 
not the former.  Under Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(c), the supporting facts of an aggravator should 
be in the notice so that the defendant can deduce the State’s theory for the aggravator.  
However, the Court held that the State did not change its theory to an accomplice theory 
because the State did not add the description of Nunnery’s codefendants in the notice of 
evidence to base the aggravator on their conduct, but rather to show that Nunnery acted 
as the leader of the crime, which placed several innocent people at risk of death. 
 Third, Nunnery argued that the notice of intent to seek the death penalty did not 
include evidence that others were present during the shooting and thus did not support a 
great-risk-of-death aggravator.  The Court held that the statement in the notice of intent 
describing the location of the crime as public place with citizens located nearby was 
sufficient. 
 Fourth, Nunnery argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
aggravator.  The Court held that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Nunnery knowingly created a great-risk-of-death under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.033(3) 
(2007) because the State presented evidence that numerous people were near the crime 
scene that Nunnery specifically chose. 
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  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 531-32 (5th ed. 1979). 
Evidence of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome 
 
 Nunnery challenged the district court’s refusal to admit testimony from Nunnery’s 
cousin.  Nunnery’s cousin would have testified that Nunnery’s mother drank alcohol 
while she was pregnant with Nunnery and Nunnery had health problems when he was 
born.  However, the court may refuse to admit evidence that is “impalpable or highly 
suspect” during the penalty phase of trial.19  The Court held that the record demonstrated 
that the testimony of Nunnery’s cousin was highly suspect and the district court’s refusal 
to admit the evidence because of it lacked credibility was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
Juror Misconduct 
 
 Nunnery challenged the district court’s inquiry into juror misconduct as 
inadequate and its refusal to declare a mistrial based on that juror misconduct, which 
consisted of statements between jurors that an expert’s testimony was long and boring.  
The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a 
mistrial because the district court conducted an adequate inquiry into the alleged 
misconduct and the juror misconduct allegations did not warrant a mistrial if proven. 
 
Jury’s Rejection of Mitigating Evidence 
  
 Nunnery challenged his death sentence and claimed that the jury’s rejection of 
mitigating circumstances supported by indisputable evidence was arbitrary and 
capricious.  The Court held that Nevada law allows jurors to decide the extent that a 
mitigating circumstance decreases, if at all, the defendant’s moral culpability regardless if 
the mitigating circumstance is supported by irrefutable evidence. 
 
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty 
 
 The Court held that Nunnery’s claims that the death penalty is unconstitutional 
failed because Nevada’s death penalty statutes do not violate the Eighth Amendment, do 
not foreclose executive clemency,
20
 and provide a narrow class of persons eligible for the 
death penalty.
21
 
 
Guilty Phase Claims 
 
Jury Selection 
 
 Nunnery challenged the district court’s admission of a peremptory challenge of 
the only African-American potential juror.  An equal protection challenge to the 
admission of a peremptory challenge requires the opponent to first prove a prima facie 
case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the proponent who must offer a neutral 
explanation for the challenge, and finally the burden shifts back to the opponent who 
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must prove purposeful discrimination.
22
  The Court held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in permitting the peremptory challenge because the State offered a 
neutral explanation, the juror’s views on the death penalty, for the challenge and the 
defense did not argue that the State’s explanation was mere pretext for discrimination.  
Had the defense challenged the State’s explanation, the Court nevertheless would have 
held that purposeful discrimination did not exist. 
 Nunnery also challenged the district court’s admission of three challenges for 
cause based on the jurors’ death penalty views.  The Court upheld the district court’s 
ruling because rulings on challenges for cause are afforded great deference
23
 and will not 
be overturned if a juror could not have adequately performed his duties because of his 
death penalty views,
24
 which each of the three jurors indicated. 
 
Motion for Mistrial 
 
 Nunnery claimed that a detective’s testimony alluded to Nunnery’s involvement 
in other homicides and warranted the district court declaring a mistrial.  A district court’s 
denial of a motion for mistrial will only be overturned if a clear showing of abuse 
exists.
25
  The Court held that a clear showing of abuse did not exist under the 
circumstances because the testimony Nunnery referred to was vague, brief, and did not 
allude to his involvement in other homicides.  
 
Guilt-Phase Jury Instructions 
 
 Nunnery challenged the validity of several jury instructions that he claimed 
lessened the State’s burden of proof and did not specify the material elements of the 
crimes.  Nunnery argued that each of the challenged jury instructions should have stated 
the State’s burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
Court held that the district court’s jury instructions did not abuse its discretion because 
three other instructions contained the standard of proof and the Court has repeatedly 
upheld similar instructions.  
 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
 Nunnery challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that he 
had the requisite intent for the attempted murder charges because he did not shoot at the 
specific victims or encourage his codefendants to shoot at them.  The Court reviewed the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and held that a rational juror could 
determine that sufficient evidence existed to prove each material element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The Court held that the record indicated that Nunnery had the specific 
intent to kill the victims because in addition to shooting two of the victims, Nunnery 
planned the crime and directed his codefendants to bring guns. 
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Mandatory Review of the Death Sentence Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 177.055(2) 
 
 Every death sentence must be reviewed to (1) ensure that the evidence supports 
the finding of at least one aggravated circumstance, (2) the death sentence was not 
imposed as a result of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor, and (3) the death 
sentence was not excessive in relation to the crime and the defendant.
26
  The Court first 
concluded that sufficient evidence existed to find six aggravated circumstances based on 
the circumstances of the crime.  Nunnery had four prior violent felonies convictions, 
created a great risk of death to more than one person, and committed the homicide during 
the commission of a robbery.  Second, the Court held that the record did not indicate that 
the jury’s death sentence was a result of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor.  Third, 
the Court held that the death sentence was not excessive because Nunnery’s actions 
indicated he was a violent person who disregarded human life and did not have any 
remorse for his cold-blooded killings. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Upon a showing of good cause, the district court has discretion to permit an 
untimely notice of evidence in aggravation.  Relevant factors in determining good cause 
include the risk of prejudice to the defense in its preparation to confront the evidence.  
Second, Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156 does not preclude the admission of presentence 
investigation reports at penalty hearings.  Third, the weighing of mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances is not a factual determination and the proper inquiry to justify 
a death sentence is whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh 
aggravating circumstances, not whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances. 
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